In 1982, Canada underwent a significant constitutional transformation. For decades, provincial and federal governments had discussed the need for changes in the constitution, but agreement on those changes was out of reach. However, during the 1980 Quebec sovereignty referendum campaign, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promised Quebecers that he would push for constitutional alterations. .Trudeau I was successful in fulfilling that promise. Canada got the Constitution Act, 1982. Most importantly, it added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending formula so that Canada could revise its own constitution without oversight from the British Parliament. There were also a few other modifications..For the West, there was a positive side and a negative side. On the one hand, provincial control of non-renewable natural resources was made more explicit. But on the other hand, institutional changes that could have improved the West’s position within Canada were ignored..The positive side is discussed by University of Calgary political scientist Roger Gibbins in his 1992 article, “Alberta and the National Community.” He notes that the Alberta government’s constitutional objectives during the negotiations were primarily defensive. That is, the top priority was protecting Alberta’s ownership and control of resources from the federal government. This strategy was successful – Section 92(A) was added to the Constitution, thus clarifying and protecting the province’s resource ownership. Such protection was particularly important in light of Pierre Trudeau’s desire to seize Alberta’s oil wealth..Alberta was also successful in helping to draft the amending formula for the constitution. As Gibbins writes, “It was here that the government made substantial progress with respect not only to the protection of provincial resources, but also with respect to the constitutional enshrinement of provincial equality. The general amending formula in section 38 (1) – Parliament plus seven of the ten provinces having in aggregate at least fifty per cent of the population of all provinces – recognizes the equality of the provinces by denying any single province the power of veto.”.In short, the Alberta government was justified in seeing the 1982 constitutional changes in a positive light due to protections for Alberta’s resources and a recognition of provincial equality. However, as Gibbins adds, “the defensive posture of the provincial government also meant that no progress was made with respect to the reform of national parliamentary institutions.”.Such lack of reform in national institutions is the subject of an earlier article written by Gibbins. This earlier article,“Constitutional Politics and the West,” was published in 1983 in a collection of academic essays entitled, And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act. Although today the constitutional changes of 1982 are almost universally celebrated as wonderful, many Canadians in the early 1980s saw things differently. As the editors of this volume wrote, there was no “real cause for national celebration in the Constitution Act, 1982.” .As Gibbins explains, the kinds of institutional reforms that could have improved the West’s place within Canada were entirely neglected: “In the end, the constitutional Accord failed to address, much less solve, the chronic problems of regional representation that have fostered western alienation and eroded the bond between western Canadians and their national government. The opportunity to fulfill the long-standing desire of western Canadians to be full partners in Confederation was lost when institutional reform was abandoned, and the blame must be shared by both levels of government.”.During the constitutional negotiations of the early 1980s, many Albertans were dead-set against Trudeau’s proposals. He had poisoned the well by introducing the National Energy Program (NEP) which involved a full-scale attack on Alberta’s oil industry. How could Albertans have any confidence in Trudeau’s constitutional agenda when he was trying to steal the source of their prosperity?.As Gibbins points out, “in Alberta, the immensely unpopular NEP and the constitutional proposals were commonly seen as a single package. Public meetings held to discuss the constitutional proposals focused almost entirely on the NEP, and the NEP became the layman’s interpretive guide to the constitution debate. The Constitution Act proposals were seen as a means to constitutionally entrench the NEP, while the NEP was seen to foreshadow the dangers ahead should the Constitution Act become the law of the land.”.Of course, the blame for all of this falls squarely on Pierre Trudeau. Because of him, as far as the West was concerned, “constitution-making was not an exercise in nation-building; Ottawa’s proposals were seen by far too many western Canadians as the regionally-insensitive product of one government, one party, and one man.”.Gibbins notes that in the past, Westerners had a strong national vision. Yet, today, this truly national vision “has begun to falter and fade. The ‘national interest’ is spoken of with derisive cynicism, and for many the ‘national’ government is not only remote from, but apart from the West.” .Trudeau’s constitutional changes did nothing to address the West’s cynicism. Aside from clearer protections for natural resources, the West’s historic complaints about the unfair structure of Confederation were ignored. Instead of a national vision, the constitutional changes entrenched a Trudeaupian vision for Canada. .This is the current situation and it will not change any time soon. The prospects for positive constitutional reform are negligible at best. That route has been tried, and it failed. Therefore, the only way for the West to get control of its own destiny is by becoming independent. .Michael Wagner is a columnist for the Western Standard
In 1982, Canada underwent a significant constitutional transformation. For decades, provincial and federal governments had discussed the need for changes in the constitution, but agreement on those changes was out of reach. However, during the 1980 Quebec sovereignty referendum campaign, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promised Quebecers that he would push for constitutional alterations. .Trudeau I was successful in fulfilling that promise. Canada got the Constitution Act, 1982. Most importantly, it added a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and an amending formula so that Canada could revise its own constitution without oversight from the British Parliament. There were also a few other modifications..For the West, there was a positive side and a negative side. On the one hand, provincial control of non-renewable natural resources was made more explicit. But on the other hand, institutional changes that could have improved the West’s position within Canada were ignored..The positive side is discussed by University of Calgary political scientist Roger Gibbins in his 1992 article, “Alberta and the National Community.” He notes that the Alberta government’s constitutional objectives during the negotiations were primarily defensive. That is, the top priority was protecting Alberta’s ownership and control of resources from the federal government. This strategy was successful – Section 92(A) was added to the Constitution, thus clarifying and protecting the province’s resource ownership. Such protection was particularly important in light of Pierre Trudeau’s desire to seize Alberta’s oil wealth..Alberta was also successful in helping to draft the amending formula for the constitution. As Gibbins writes, “It was here that the government made substantial progress with respect not only to the protection of provincial resources, but also with respect to the constitutional enshrinement of provincial equality. The general amending formula in section 38 (1) – Parliament plus seven of the ten provinces having in aggregate at least fifty per cent of the population of all provinces – recognizes the equality of the provinces by denying any single province the power of veto.”.In short, the Alberta government was justified in seeing the 1982 constitutional changes in a positive light due to protections for Alberta’s resources and a recognition of provincial equality. However, as Gibbins adds, “the defensive posture of the provincial government also meant that no progress was made with respect to the reform of national parliamentary institutions.”.Such lack of reform in national institutions is the subject of an earlier article written by Gibbins. This earlier article,“Constitutional Politics and the West,” was published in 1983 in a collection of academic essays entitled, And No One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy and the Constitution Act. Although today the constitutional changes of 1982 are almost universally celebrated as wonderful, many Canadians in the early 1980s saw things differently. As the editors of this volume wrote, there was no “real cause for national celebration in the Constitution Act, 1982.” .As Gibbins explains, the kinds of institutional reforms that could have improved the West’s place within Canada were entirely neglected: “In the end, the constitutional Accord failed to address, much less solve, the chronic problems of regional representation that have fostered western alienation and eroded the bond between western Canadians and their national government. The opportunity to fulfill the long-standing desire of western Canadians to be full partners in Confederation was lost when institutional reform was abandoned, and the blame must be shared by both levels of government.”.During the constitutional negotiations of the early 1980s, many Albertans were dead-set against Trudeau’s proposals. He had poisoned the well by introducing the National Energy Program (NEP) which involved a full-scale attack on Alberta’s oil industry. How could Albertans have any confidence in Trudeau’s constitutional agenda when he was trying to steal the source of their prosperity?.As Gibbins points out, “in Alberta, the immensely unpopular NEP and the constitutional proposals were commonly seen as a single package. Public meetings held to discuss the constitutional proposals focused almost entirely on the NEP, and the NEP became the layman’s interpretive guide to the constitution debate. The Constitution Act proposals were seen as a means to constitutionally entrench the NEP, while the NEP was seen to foreshadow the dangers ahead should the Constitution Act become the law of the land.”.Of course, the blame for all of this falls squarely on Pierre Trudeau. Because of him, as far as the West was concerned, “constitution-making was not an exercise in nation-building; Ottawa’s proposals were seen by far too many western Canadians as the regionally-insensitive product of one government, one party, and one man.”.Gibbins notes that in the past, Westerners had a strong national vision. Yet, today, this truly national vision “has begun to falter and fade. The ‘national interest’ is spoken of with derisive cynicism, and for many the ‘national’ government is not only remote from, but apart from the West.” .Trudeau’s constitutional changes did nothing to address the West’s cynicism. Aside from clearer protections for natural resources, the West’s historic complaints about the unfair structure of Confederation were ignored. Instead of a national vision, the constitutional changes entrenched a Trudeaupian vision for Canada. .This is the current situation and it will not change any time soon. The prospects for positive constitutional reform are negligible at best. That route has been tried, and it failed. Therefore, the only way for the West to get control of its own destiny is by becoming independent. .Michael Wagner is a columnist for the Western Standard
