Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault confirmed at the China Inquiry Thursday that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agents influenced the 2021 federal election. Chinese agents worked to elect “pro-China” candidates to the current Parliament, testified Vigneault at the Commission on Foreign Interference, per Blacklock’s Reporter. “I support those conclusions,” said Vigneault, after being presented with an internal federal memo called After Action Report 2021 Federal Election, which shows large cash payments made to unnamed public office holders.The memo, dated December 17 2021, was put together by the CSIS Threats to Elections Task Force. “The People’s Republic of China sought to clandestinely and deceptively influence Canada’s 2021 federal election,” the intelligence special talk force wrote. “This foreign influence was pragmatic in nature and focused primarily on supporting individuals viewed to be either ‘pro-PRC’ or ‘neutral’ on issues of interest to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government and CCP.”“The Task Force also observed online media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians particularly of Chinese heritage from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada, party leader Erin O’Toole and particularly former Steveston-Richmond East candidate Kenny Chiu.”Gib van Ert, counsel for Conservative MP Michael Chong, questioned Director Vigneault on whether CSIS agreed with the Action Report memo. “Do you accept these conclusions?” asked Counsel van Ert. “I recognize this information,” replied Vigneault.“I am comfortable with the conclusions this document speaks to. I would not have any specific comment about political matters as you can imagine.”“These words have been crafted very carefully,” said Vigneault. “For the commission record I support those conclusions.”The commission revealed another document called In Camera Examination Summary, in which CSIS discussed “possible People’s Republic of China interference” at a 2019 Liberal Party nomination won by MP Han Dong.A separate document outlined “potential foreign interference by a politically-connected Canadian” in 2019. The individual was not named.“That person had not previously been identified as acting on behalf of a foreign state but appeared to have been doing so in the period leading up to the 2019 election,” said the summary.“The report initially assessed it likely the actor ‘has already had an impact on the 2019 federal election and will remain a foreign interference threat after the election.’”CSIS in a sworn statement by Regional Office Executive, Bo Basler, also detailed influence by the CCP over Canada’s Chinese-language press. “In 2019 candidates the People’s Republic of China disliked received little to no coverage in Chinese language news media and would not be invited to Chinese Canadian community events,” the sworn statement reads. “The PRC strategy was to make these candidates unappealing by rendering them unknown while heavily promoting China’s favoured candidates.”“By 2021, the China strategy had evolved from passive shunning to active reputational attacks. For example, as in the case of Kenny Chiu, candidates who were not favoured by the PRC were labeled as racist or anti-Chinese.”Yet another report released by the commission Thursday, People’s Republic Of China: Threat Actors, Contact With Candidates And Funding Of Threat Actors, documents illegal cash payments by the CCP to Canadian friends of China, with numbers running up to six figures. “Prior to and during the 43rd general election in 2019 a group of known and suspected PRC-related threat actors in Canada including PRC officials worked in loose coordination with one another to covertly advance PRC interests through Canadian democratic institutions,” it said. “Reporting indicated 11 political candidates and 13 political staff members were assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by this group of threat actors.”“Intelligence assessments suggest some of these threat actors received financial support from the PRC. For example, there likely were at least two transfers of funds approximating $250,000 from PRC officials in Canada possibly for foreign influence-related purposes though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates.”“These were transferred via multiple individuals to obfuscate their origins via an influential community leader, to the staff member of a 2019 federal election candidate and then to an Ontario MPP. The transfers reportedly took place in late 2018, early 2019.”CSIS Director Vigneault confirmed the report was accurate. “That is a correct statement,” he said. “We are not at liberty to discuss classified information,” added Vigneault, but called the report “the most accurate possible depiction of what we know while protecting classified information.”A second suspicious “distribution of funds” was identified by the Communications Security Establishment regarding the 2021 election, according to a Public Summary Of Classified In Camera Examination of agency officials. “The intelligence was promptly shared with the Minister of National Defence, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, the RCMP and Canadian Security Intelligence Service” as well as the United States and other allies, it said.“I know what this refers to,” testified Director Vigneault.“As you can imagine, we are not at liberty to discuss the specifics. These documents should be read for what they say.”
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director David Vigneault confirmed at the China Inquiry Thursday that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agents influenced the 2021 federal election. Chinese agents worked to elect “pro-China” candidates to the current Parliament, testified Vigneault at the Commission on Foreign Interference, per Blacklock’s Reporter. “I support those conclusions,” said Vigneault, after being presented with an internal federal memo called After Action Report 2021 Federal Election, which shows large cash payments made to unnamed public office holders.The memo, dated December 17 2021, was put together by the CSIS Threats to Elections Task Force. “The People’s Republic of China sought to clandestinely and deceptively influence Canada’s 2021 federal election,” the intelligence special talk force wrote. “This foreign influence was pragmatic in nature and focused primarily on supporting individuals viewed to be either ‘pro-PRC’ or ‘neutral’ on issues of interest to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government and CCP.”“The Task Force also observed online media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians particularly of Chinese heritage from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada, party leader Erin O’Toole and particularly former Steveston-Richmond East candidate Kenny Chiu.”Gib van Ert, counsel for Conservative MP Michael Chong, questioned Director Vigneault on whether CSIS agreed with the Action Report memo. “Do you accept these conclusions?” asked Counsel van Ert. “I recognize this information,” replied Vigneault.“I am comfortable with the conclusions this document speaks to. I would not have any specific comment about political matters as you can imagine.”“These words have been crafted very carefully,” said Vigneault. “For the commission record I support those conclusions.”The commission revealed another document called In Camera Examination Summary, in which CSIS discussed “possible People’s Republic of China interference” at a 2019 Liberal Party nomination won by MP Han Dong.A separate document outlined “potential foreign interference by a politically-connected Canadian” in 2019. The individual was not named.“That person had not previously been identified as acting on behalf of a foreign state but appeared to have been doing so in the period leading up to the 2019 election,” said the summary.“The report initially assessed it likely the actor ‘has already had an impact on the 2019 federal election and will remain a foreign interference threat after the election.’”CSIS in a sworn statement by Regional Office Executive, Bo Basler, also detailed influence by the CCP over Canada’s Chinese-language press. “In 2019 candidates the People’s Republic of China disliked received little to no coverage in Chinese language news media and would not be invited to Chinese Canadian community events,” the sworn statement reads. “The PRC strategy was to make these candidates unappealing by rendering them unknown while heavily promoting China’s favoured candidates.”“By 2021, the China strategy had evolved from passive shunning to active reputational attacks. For example, as in the case of Kenny Chiu, candidates who were not favoured by the PRC were labeled as racist or anti-Chinese.”Yet another report released by the commission Thursday, People’s Republic Of China: Threat Actors, Contact With Candidates And Funding Of Threat Actors, documents illegal cash payments by the CCP to Canadian friends of China, with numbers running up to six figures. “Prior to and during the 43rd general election in 2019 a group of known and suspected PRC-related threat actors in Canada including PRC officials worked in loose coordination with one another to covertly advance PRC interests through Canadian democratic institutions,” it said. “Reporting indicated 11 political candidates and 13 political staff members were assessed to be either implicated in or impacted by this group of threat actors.”“Intelligence assessments suggest some of these threat actors received financial support from the PRC. For example, there likely were at least two transfers of funds approximating $250,000 from PRC officials in Canada possibly for foreign influence-related purposes though most likely not in an attempt to covertly fund the 11 candidates.”“These were transferred via multiple individuals to obfuscate their origins via an influential community leader, to the staff member of a 2019 federal election candidate and then to an Ontario MPP. The transfers reportedly took place in late 2018, early 2019.”CSIS Director Vigneault confirmed the report was accurate. “That is a correct statement,” he said. “We are not at liberty to discuss classified information,” added Vigneault, but called the report “the most accurate possible depiction of what we know while protecting classified information.”A second suspicious “distribution of funds” was identified by the Communications Security Establishment regarding the 2021 election, according to a Public Summary Of Classified In Camera Examination of agency officials. “The intelligence was promptly shared with the Minister of National Defence, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, the RCMP and Canadian Security Intelligence Service” as well as the United States and other allies, it said.“I know what this refers to,” testified Director Vigneault.“As you can imagine, we are not at liberty to discuss the specifics. These documents should be read for what they say.”
