Dr. Bryan Brulotte is Chairman of Sterling-Trust, a Canadian private equity firm. He brings more than four decades of leadership experience spanning the military, private, and public sectors.Russia does not have to finish its war in Ukraine before confronting NATO. That assumption is comforting, but strategically dangerous. Moscow can continue grinding forward in Ukraine while simultaneously undertaking a limited military or hybrid action intended to weaken the Alliance from within. Its objective would not necessarily be conquest. It could be something more consequential: proving that Article 5 can be invoked without producing a rapid, unified, and decisive response.Article 5 is NATO’s political and military centre of gravity. An armed attack against one Ally is considered an attack against all, but the treaty allows each member to take “such action as it deems necessary.” That flexibility has helped preserve NATO unity for decades. It also creates an opening that Vladimir Putin may believe he can exploit by keeping an attack limited, ambiguous, or deniable enough that Allied governments disagree over attribution, proportionality, and escalation.The most plausible danger is not an immediate Russian armoured invasion across the entire Baltic frontier. It is a drone or missile strike presented as accidental, sabotage that produces civilian casualties, a cyberattack with strategic effects, infiltration by irregular forces, or a shallow incursion that seizes a small area before NATO can reinforce it. Russia could then deny responsibility, threaten nuclear escalation, and offer negotiations. The operation might be modest, but its political effect could be enormous.Recent warnings across Europe must therefore be taken seriously. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has warned that Russia may conduct drone or missile attacks against NATO territory and disguise them as accidents. France says Russian hybrid operations are intensifying, while Germany has attributed an attempted explosive-drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Moscow. Britain supported that attribution; Lithuania is hardening critical infrastructure near Kaliningrad and the Suwałki corridor, and even neutral Switzerland has warned that its infrastructure could be targeted because of its importance to Europe..The most striking signal came from Washington. CIA Director John Ratcliffe travelled to Moscow in August and reportedly warned Russian intelligence officials against attacking NATO members, particularly the Baltic states. This does not mean an attack is imminent, and the intelligence behind the visit remains classified. But intelligence chiefs do not normally make such journeys without serious cause, particularly when the mission recalls CIA Director William Burns’s warning to Moscow only months before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.Russia’s war in Ukraine and a test of NATO are not competing strategies. They can be mutually supporting. Pressure against NATO territory could force European governments to retain scarce air defence systems, ammunition, and aircraft at home, while political fear could weaken support for Kyiv. Ukraine has also given Russia combat experience, expanded military production, and a continuing environment in which sabotage, cyberattacks, GPS interference, and covert operations against Western states can become normalized.Russia would not require another mass army to conduct such an operation. Ukraine assesses that Moscow may draft approximately 300,000 additional personnel following Russia’s parliamentary elections, although reports of an immediate 500,000-person mobilization remain unconfirmed. Russia faces real training, equipment, and administrative constraints. Yet a limited Article 5 test could be undertaken by intelligence services, proxies, drones, missiles, electronic warfare units, or a small combined-arms force while most Russian troops remain committed in Ukraine.The critical measurement would not be the number of Russian soldiers involved. It would be NATO’s decision time: the interval between an incident, credible attribution, and collective action. Moscow would try to lengthen that interval through denial, disinformation, legal ambiguity, and threats of escalation. If Allied governments spend days debating whether an incident was deliberate while Russia consolidates its position, the Kremlin will have gained the initiative before NATO fires a shot..This is why deterrence requires more than declarations that Article 5 is sacred. NATO needs pre-agreed response options for sabotage, cyberattacks, drone and missile strikes, irregular incursions, and temporary territorial seizures. Political leaders must exercise decisions under incomplete intelligence, limited casualties, and intense nuclear intimidation. Military commanders require the forces, authorities, and logistics to respond during the first hours of a crisis, not after Moscow has created a fait accompli and offered talks.Canada is not a distant observer. We lead NATO’s multinational brigade in Latvia, placing Canadian soldiers and commanders at the centre of any Baltic crisis. If Russia tests the Alliance there, Ottawa could face decisions about combat, reinforcement, and escalation almost immediately. Our credibility will depend not on speeches or expenditure announcements, but on whether that brigade can detect, decide, and respond before ambiguity becomes paralysis.That demands combat capability. The Canadian-led brigade requires layered air defence, counter-drone systems, long-range fires, engineers, secure communications, pre-positioned ammunition and fuel, medical capacity, and reliable reinforcement through contested ports, airfields, and sea lanes. National caveats and approval processes must not leave Canadian commanders unable to act when minutes matter. Presence deters only when it is backed by the ability and authority to fight.Canada must also strengthen the home front. NORAD modernization, Arctic surveillance, cyber defence, and the protection of ports, railways, energy systems, and telecommunications must be treated as parts of collective defence. Our defence-industrial base must produce ammunition, drones, sensors, and replacement equipment at wartime speed. Capability deters aggression. Announcements do not..Supporting Ukraine and defending NATO are not competing missions. Russia should not be permitted to manufacture a crisis that frightens Allied governments into abandoning Kyiv or retaining every scarce munition at home. A Ukrainian defeat would release experienced Russian forces, validate Moscow’s strategy, and bring greater pressure to NATO’s borders. Sustained support for Ukraine remains one of the most effective ways to prevent a wider war.Canada’s political leadership must also prepare Canadians for the nature of the threat. Hybrid warfare exploits public confusion, institutional hesitation, and the understandable fear of escalation. Governments that communicate only after an attack surrender the information battlefield to Moscow. Ottawa should explain in advance that cyber sabotage, attacks on infrastructure, and deniable incursions are not isolated disturbances when they form part of a coordinated campaign against the Alliance. Parliament should be briefed, provincial governments should be included in preparedness exercises, and civilian infrastructure operators should understand their defence responsibilities. National security is not confined to military bases. It depends upon a society that recognizes aggression, trusts its institutions, and collectively refuses to be intimidated.The answer is not alarmism, but preparation. Russia must understand that ambiguity may affect the form of NATO’s response, but never its certainty. A limited attack cannot be allowed to produce a limited political consequence. If Canada and its Allies possess the capability, readiness, and will to act from the first hour, Putin’s gamble will fail before he makes it.Dr. Bryan Brulotte is Chairman of Sterling-Trust, a Canadian private equity firm. He brings more than four decades of leadership experience spanning the military, private, and public sectors.
