TAYLOR: The truth at last... CSIS reveals story of Chinese spies who got away with it

Spy novelist John Le Carré established his reputation with 1963’s The Spy Who Came in From the Cold. Set at the height of the Cold War, it describes washed-up British spy Alec Leamas’ attempt to infiltrate East German intelligence as a double agent. It’s a grim tale of hidden identities, uncertain alliances and spymasters prepared to sacrifice their own men in pursuit of bigger game. According to Le Carré — who worked for Britain’s MI6 in Germany while writing the book — the modern world of espionage is unpleasant, unglamourous and devoid of loyalty. Unhappy endings are inevitable.Despite its much-lauded air of verisimilitude, however, The Spy Who Came in From the Cold remains a work of fiction set in a now-distant past. And based on recent events in Canada, the current world of international espionage appears at sharp odds with Le Carré’s downbeat perspective. In fact, newly-unclassified documents tied to one of Canada’s biggest intelligence scandals suggest modern-day spies can live happily ever-after.If there is an unhappy ending, it’s to Canada’s reputation as a trustworthy and competent ally.In July 2019, two scientists at Canada’s high-security National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) in a Winnipeg were escorted off the property for what the Public Health Agency of Canada called an “administrative matter.” At the time, Xiangguo Qiu was Head of Vaccines and Antivirals in the Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens division of NML and internationally renowned for her work on Ebola. Her husband Keding Cheng was a staff biologist. Both came to Canada from China in the 1990s and are naturalized Canadian citizens.As the NML is Canada’s only Level 4 Biosafety Lab — meaning it is the only place in the country where deadly viruses such as Ebola and Henipah are stored and studied — opposition MPs demanded evidence explaining Qiu and Cheng’s mysterious “administrative” problems. The Trudeau government fought ferociously to prevent the release of this information. At one point, the Liberals even threatened to sue the Speaker of the House of Commons to keep the material secret. Following the 2021 election, however, the weakened Liberal minority government relented and most of the requested information was declassified.Made public this past February, the 623-page dossier is likely the biggest collection of top-secret Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) reports ever released. And it tells a shocking tale. As the declassified files show, Qiu and Cheng had been under surveillance since September 2018. And this investigation showed they had deliberately and repeatedly acted on behalf of Communist China and against the interests of Canada.These actions include transferring intellectual and physical property to Chinese institutions as well as opening their labs to Chinese researchers with clear links to China’s military. Among Qiu’s frequent collaborators is Major-General Chen Wei, described by a U.S. congressional investigation as China’s “top biowarfare expert.” Qiu and Cheng also appear to have been involved in numerous Chinese “talent” programs — thinly-veiled espionage schemes designed to steal know-how from other countries.Qiu’s skills and position were clearly very attractive to Chinese institutions making talent applications in her name. One particularly eager suitor was the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), now infamous for its proximity to the epicentre of the global outbreak of Covid-19 and its possible role as the source of the SARS CoV-2 virus. According to one CSIS report, the WIV said it considered Qiu to be “the only highly experienced Chinese expert available internationally” for its expansion plans.Beyond Qiu’s much-needed experience and know-how, the WIV also wanted her help in getting a supply of deadly viruses necessary for its future research efforts. Months before she was escorted off the property in 2019, Qiu arranged to send 30 vials of deadly virus samples, including Ebola and Henipah, from NML’s stockpile to the WIV.The evidence thus strongly suggests Qiu was a vital component of China’s efforts to enhance its biological research capabilities using information and materials taken from Canada’s highest security biohazard lab. And it was a relationship Qiu and Cheng attempted to keep well hidden. As early as 2016 Qiu held multiple positions at Chinese universities which she left off her Canadian CVs. And according to CSIS, Cheng conducted a three-year long experiment at his lab in Winnipeg on behalf of China’s Centre for Disease Control without NML management’s knowledge.While the investigation did strip Qiu and Cheng of their access to the NML after alarms were raised — and they were finally fired in January 2021 — the message embedded in their fate is hardly one of deterrence. Not only were they not prosecuted for any crimes, but according to the Globe and Mail they are now living comfortably back in China where they have adopted new names.The fact it took two-and-a-half years to fire what appear to be obvious spies is clearly a blow to the competency of the Liberal government. Yet the real damage is to Canada’s international reputation. “This is confirmation of our worst fears,” says Christian Leuprecht, a national security expert and professor of political science at Queen’s University and the Royal Military College of Canada. “No other country, at least from what we know, has experienced the same degree of infiltration. Everything in these documents reinforces the perception that Canada is the weak link.”In friendly Western countries, Leuprecht observes, the Trudeau government’s passivity in the face of Chinese aggression has created the perception Canada does not take matters of national security or defence seriously. And this is weakening our stature abroad. Perhaps the biggest consequence is that Canada is no longer treated as a top-tier member of NATO, the premier Western military alliance. “We are increasingly being left out of meetings, our speaking time is vastly reduced and information is not being shared,” Leuprecht observes.At a time when our allies seem less willing to engage with Canada on defence matters, evidence that our highest-security biohazard lab was exploited by federally-employed Chinese agents strikes to the very core of our reliability.Alongside the many Canadian journalists and politicians who have been poring through the documents, Leuprecht notes that foreign intelligence services will also be studying the dossier carefully and making their own judgements. “What will German intelligence or MI6 or the CIA think about collaborating with Canada in the future when they read these files?” asks Leuprecht. “The first thing they will see is a bunch of rookie mistakes.”This is not a criticism of CSIS. “My sense is that CSIS did what it was supposed to do,” Leuprecht explains. “There is no suggestion they didn’t take the threat seriously.” Canada’s rookie mistakes, he says, lie with the bureaucrats and politicians who should have acted with greater alacrity on the information they were given.As an intelligence-gathering agency CSIS cannot arrest anyone or carry out other law enforcement activities. It can only make recommendations to the federal institutions it serves. It was therefore up to the Public Health Agency of Canada to decide how to deal with Qiu and Cheng. Leuprecht suggests the agency may have been slow to react because senior administrators were blinded by the celebrity of Qiu, who was internationally recognized for her work on Ebola. “The lab had this superstar scientist and it prioritized a research culture and international collaboration over national security procedures,” he asserts. It is also possible, he admits, that the federal government dithered over prosecuting the couple out of fear of angering China, given its past experience with the Two Michaels hostage-taking fiasco.Whatever the reason, “That they were allowed to walk out of the country seems quite stunning,” Leuprecht notes. “If you want to keep someone in the country, there are lots of ways to go about it.” As it was, they apparently left during the Covid-19 pandemic at a time when China had closed its borders to international air travel. This suggests a deliberate arrangement between Canada and China to keep the whole matter quiet. Despite the wealth of information included in the NML documents, Leuprecht admits it is impossible to determine the true nature of Qiu and Cheng’s deception. They could have been sleeper agents of the sort featured in the TV series The Americans, inserted into Canadian society decades ahead of their mission. Or they might have been recruited only after gaining access to the highest levels of the NML. It is even possible they were simply naïve dupes manipulated by clever Chinese operatives into doing the bidding of the PLA under the guise of improving international scientific collaboration. Regardless, what stands out for Leuprecht is “the boldness with which they continued operating even after they’d been tipped off.”Qiu’s shipment of 30 vials of deadly virus samples from the NML to the WIV occurred on March 29, 2019. At this time, Qiu and Cheng already knew they were being watched; both had been interviewed by investigators on February 15, 2019. “My guess,” says Leuprecht, “is that they got direction from Beijing to get whatever they could out of the lab and that they would be taken care of and rewarded.” Given how things turned out — with both Qiu and Cheng back in China living under new names — it seems an entirely reasonable bit of speculation. Canada’s is rapidly earning a reputation as a spy’s happy hunting grounds.“The message we are sending is that if you want to infiltrate a country, Canada is a great place to go,” declares Leuprecht. “We are not particularly vigilant, and if we do catch you, we will let you leave the country so you can have a great career in China afterwards. If you were sitting in China reading through these 623 pages, you’d say to yourself, ‘Canada, that’s the country we’re going after.’”Peter Shawn Taylor is senior features editor at C2C Journal, where a longer, two-part version of this story first appeared.